Poland has recently experienced a constitutional crisis. The crisis involves the role of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in the election of judges and amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal Act which threatens the independence of the Tribunal. The situation is exacerbated by changes in the media, civil service, police, and prosecution laws introduced by the ruling party. This article analyses the changes, as well as the domestic and international reactions to the crisis, and considers whether the heavy criticism of the PiS is justified, or whether it results from, for instance, specific characteristics of the Polish political system and an unfavourable opinion in Europe about the Law and Justice party.
INTRODUCTION
leaders of the various political groups decided to defer any decision to issue a (unbinding) resolution until the results of the communication between the Polish government and the EU Commission and the opinion of the Venice Commission relating to the same issues. 8 It is highly probable that the EU Parliament will return to this matter, as the latter institution (The Venice Commission) on March 11 published a very unfavourable opinion about Poland.
9 3 More about the activities of the Committee at: http://komitetobronydemokracji.pl. 4 European Commission press release (January 13, 2016) // http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO- 16 6 Hungary in line with couple of other Member States is very likely to oppose such action. 7 Jan Werner Müller, "Safeguarding democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the future of liberal order," Transatlantic Academy Paper Series 3 (2013): 17-18, 29; Philip Weyand, "Politik, Recht und die Rule of Law irgendwo dazwischen: zur Rechtsstaatlichkeits¬debatte zwischen EU und Polen," Verfassungsblog (January 21, 2016) // http://verfassungsblog.de/politik-recht-und-die-rule-of-law-irgendwo-dazwischenzur-rechtsstaatlichkeitsdebatte-zwischen-eu-und-polen/. 8 The Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law) founded in 1990 is an advisory body of the Council of Europe. Its opinions are deemed as most respectful in terms of rule of law and democracy issues. The Polish Prime Minister refused to answer whether Poland will follow its recommendations. 9 
Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD (2016)001 on the Amendments of the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland adopted at 106
th Plenary Session, Venice (March [11] [12] 2016) .
in the Sejm but in practice ends only after being sworn in by the President. 13 The 18 Moreover, the suspicion of invalidity of the Act regulating the election of judges enjoys presumption of constitutionality until proven to the contrary by the Constitutional Tribunal.
In a similar manner, the Tribunal addressed this issue in its second 19 16 Pursuant to Article 191 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland the following public bodies can make application to the Constitutional Tribunal: the President of the Republic, the Marshal of the Sejm, the Marshal of the Senate, the Prime Minister, 50 Deputies, 30 Senators, the First President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Public Prosecutor-General, the President of the Supreme Chamber of Control and the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, the National Council of the Judiciary, to the extent specified in Article 186, para. 2, the constitutive organs of units of local government, the national organs of trade unions as well as the national authorities of employers' organizations and occupational organizations, churches and religious organizations and the subjects referred to in Article 79 to the extent specified therein. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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In both judgements the Tribunal confirmed that the election of two of the five judges (Professors Andrzej Sokala, and Bronisław Sitek) was flawed. This was because it was done by the VII Sejm, whose term ended on November 12, while the tenure of the elected judges was to commence on the 2nd and 8th of December respectively, the same day the nine-year tenure of the two former judges ended.
The three other judges, whose tenure ended on the 6th of November (Professors Roman Hauser, Krzysztof Ślebzak and Andrzej Jakubecki) were elected properly, as the tenure of the Sejm overlapped with the date of the ending of the tenure of three former judges. 20 In other words, only the Sejm in office during which term of office the tenure of the Constitutional Tribunal judge(s) expires is entitled to elect judge(s); it would act ultra vires electing judges, whose term ends during the term of office of the prospective Sejm.
The belief held by the Law and Justice Party that the procedure for the appointment of the judges by the previous Sejm was flawed was seen as an obvious reason for not appointing them. As such, it triggered an accelerated procedure for the election and nomination of the five new judges as early as ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the mode of proceedings before it, shall be specified by statute".
30
On one hand, the principle of presumption of constitutionality of Statues applies, whereas, on the other hand, it is evident that any Sejm could paralyse the Tribunal and that indeed these provisions were a subject of scrutiny. The Tribunal's argument was based on the grounds that, a)
there is no other organ entrusted with the task to determine constitutionality of 
FINDING A WAY OUT
Bearing in mind the complexity of the situation, which is a relic of legal negligence of the previous epochs, it is difficult to say who has right in the present dispute, as legal arguments are on both sides. circumstances, also lead to calumniation by reference to legal instruments being at the disposal of antagonistic political forces.
To elucidate on the first argument, it is necessary to give recourse to the characteristics of the Polish political system, which gives more power to those who gain the most public support. Hence, not all criticism espoused against the ruling party (PiS) can be objectively justified, especially when its opponents complain about the scope of power. In this instance, the Polish political system is at fault and In such circumstances it is problematic to arrive at an objective and impartial conclusion on the matter, as the case is somehow more reminiscent of a wide-scale political rivalry than of a pure legal dispute. 58 Clearly, politics and law are closely entangled in this instance, which is also evident in the Venice Commission Opinion, which, while proposing a solution to the crisis, noted: "As a political actor, the Sejm ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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is also best placed to establish a dialogue conducive to a political solution". 59 
